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Abstract
This note further characterizes the tacit collusion equilibria in the in-
vestment timing game of Boyer, Lasserre and Moreaux [1]. Tacit collusion
equilibria may or may not exist, and when they do may involve either ﬁ-
nite time investments (type 1) or inﬁnite delay (type 2). The relationship
between equilibria and common demand forms is not immediately appar-
ent. We provide the full necessary and suﬃcient conditions for existence.
A simple condition on demand primitives is derived that determines the
type of equilibria. Common demand forms are then shown to illustrate
both ﬁnite-time and inﬁnite-delay tacit collusion.
JEL classiﬁcation: C73; D43; D92; L13.
Keywords: Real options; Duopoly; Collusion; Investment
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In a recent paper, Boyer, Lasserre, and Moreaux (henceforth BLM) study the
possible investment paths in a continuous time noncooperative Cournot duopoly.
Firms face market demand development uncertainty and may acquire lumpy ca-
pacity units at any point in time. Their work integrates both the more recent
“real options” methodology and a timing game àl aFudenberg and Tirole [3].
The authors ﬁnd that, when ﬁrms are capacity constrained, preemptive equilib-
ria always exist, but tacit collusion equilibria in which both ﬁrms delay investing
over a ﬁnite period, or never invest, may also arise, depending on payoﬀs. This
note extends the work of BLM [1] by fully characterizing the conditions under
which one or the other type of (Pareto superior) collusive outcome may obtain
in equilibrium. These conditions are generally intricate, but we unveil a simple
criterion to discriminate between ﬁnite or inﬁnite delay in collusive investment
choices that relates directly to the structure of demand. The easy applicability
of our conditions is illustrated by examples. Using common demand forms we
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1show that, in the linear demand case, in all collusive equilibria ﬁrms abstain
from investing forever, and only by adding a curvature parameter do both types
of equilibria arise.
For the note to be self-contained, in Section 1 we brieﬂy presents the model
in the same notation as the original paper. The conditions for tacit collusion
are provided in Section 2. Examples follow in Section 3.
2 The Model
We begin by describing (a case of) BLM’s model and essential results.1 Two
ﬁrms compete in quantities in a market with inverse demand Pt = YtD(Xt)
where Xt is total quantity, D(Xt) is positive, strictly decreasing, and strictly
concave, and the shock Yt follows a geometric Brownian motion, dYt = αYtdt+
σYtdWt,w i t hY0 > 0, α > 0 (growth rate), σ > 0 (volatility), and where (Zt)t≥0
is a standard Wiener process. The timing of the game is as follows: 1) given
the realization of Yt, and existing capital stocks, each ﬁrm chooses to invest a
number of “lumpy” capacity units; 2) given capacity units, each ﬁrm selects an
output level under capacity constraint; 3) given output levels, market price is
determined according to the inverse demand function.
Production is costless, so the optimal (unique and stable) per-period Cournot
output xc of each ﬁrm without capacity constraints is time-independent. Both
ﬁrms are initially capacity constrained with capital stock k ∈ N\{0} and each
of them may relax the constraint by investing in one additional unit. The end
of the investment game is near, in that xc − 1 ≤ k<x c. Firms decide non-
cooperatively (contracts are ruled out) and without commitment when to invest
in an additional unit of capacity at cost I.L e t l = k +1 .W h e n a ﬁrm has i
units of capacity while its rival has j units, its instantaneous variable proﬁti s
denoted as Ytπij. Initially, with capacity k,b o t hﬁrms earn Ytπkk = YtD(2k)k.
When they both have capacity l,t h e ym a ys e l lxc,s ot h a tYtπll = YtD(2xc)xc.
Note that πlk > πkk > πkl,a n dπlk > πll > πkl.
Letting y ≡ Yt stand for the current demand shock, BLM establish that









¶β πll − πlk
r − α
ykl,










> 1,a n dr>α is a constant interest
rate.2 (The latter inequality must hold true otherwise a ﬁrm’s value is maxi-
mized by postponing investments for ever.)
1BLM describe investment choices over the entire “tree” for ﬁrms that begin with no initial
capacity and may make multiple investments; our focus is on a subgame where both ﬁrms’
capacities are near the Cournot output.
2The expression of β is standard. See Dixit and Pindyck ([2], pp. 140-144) for a detailed
exposition of the steps that lead to it.
2A ﬁrm’s value from investing as a follower at ykl if its rival invests immedi-














Each ﬁrm may beneﬁt from the growing demand by relaxing the capacity con-
straint before its rival. In the absence of commitment vis-à-vis investment
choices, competition for the lead position results in a preemption equilibrium,
in which one of the two ﬁrms — with equiprobability — invests before its rival. In




kl. The trigger y
p
kk denotes the preemption threshold. It is de-












πll−πklI =a r gm a x ykl Fkk (y,ykl),i st h eo p t i -
mal follower threshold. Before y reaches y
p




kl,t h el e a d i n gﬁrm f earns Ytπlk, while ﬁrm −f earns Ytπkl.B o t h
ﬁrms earn Ytπll when y ≥ y∗
kl.
Firms may also coordinate investment choices. The value, measured at y,
if both ﬁrms invest simultaneously at the (possibly inﬁnite) joint investment











¯ ykk − I
¶
.
With the privately optimal simultaneous investment trigger ys
kk, ﬁrms’ payoﬀ is
S∗ ≡ Skk (y,ys
kk).
3 Conditions for Tacit Collusion
Preemption equilibrium investment triggers (y
p
kk,y∗
kl) always exist, but as BLM
show, either simultaneous investments at a ﬁnite or inﬁnite ys
kk may constitute
a Pareto dominant MPE. More formally:
Proposition 1 (BLM [1]) Suppose Y0 ≤ y
p
kk :
1. An e c e s s a r ya n ds u ﬃcient condition for a tacit collusion MPE to exist is:
S∗ ≥ L(y,y∗
kl), ∀y ≤ y∗
kl. (1)
If this inequality is strict, there exists a continuum of tacit collusion MPEs.
From the ﬁrms’ point of view, these MPEs are Pareto ranked.






πll−πkkI =a r gm a x ykk S (y,ykk) if πll > πkk (type 1 collusion),
or inﬁnite otherwise (type 2 collusion).
3The existence of the tacit collusion equilibrium therefore depends on the
function S∗. Note that although (1) is very general as it does not refer explic-
itly to instantaneous proﬁts, it may be expressed diﬀerently depending on the


















With some algebra, the necessary and suﬃcient condition (1) may be expressed
as follows:
Proposition 2 (Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for collusive equilibria) Sup-
pose Y0 ≤ y
p
kk :
1. A type 1 Pareto optimal collusion equilibrium exists if (BLM) and only if
πll > πkk and:
(πlk − πkk)
β ≤ (πlk − πkk)(πll − πkk)
β−1+(β − 1)(πlk − πll)(πll − πkl)
β−1 .
(3)
2. A type 2 Pareto optimal collusion equilibrium exists if and only if πll ≤ πkk
and:
(πlk − πkk)
β ≤ β (πlk − πll)(πll − πkl)
β−1 . (4)
Proof. (see Appendix)
BLM state the suﬃcient condition (3), but necessity is more elaborate to es-
tablish. In addition, Proposition 2 provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for type 2 collusion.
Conditions (3) and (4) do not have obvious economic interpretations, but
on the other hand we can remark that, when a Pareto optimal tacit collusion
equilibrium exists, its nature hinges on the sign of the diﬀerence πll − πkk,a n d
this diﬀerence can be related simply to the demand primitive. We establish that
the sign of this diﬀerence actually depends on the straightforward comparison
of the initial stock of capital, k, with a critical level of output, x∗,w h i c hi s
the unique quantity strictly lower than xc satisfying D(2x∗)x∗ = D(2xc)xc.
Existence and uniqueness of x∗ result from the strict concavity of D(Xt).O n
the basis of this, we can oﬀer a characterization of the type of Pareto optimal
tacit collusion equilibria in the model, as follows.
Proposition 3 (Discrimination of collusive equilibria) Suppose Y0 ≤ y
p
kk. The
Pareto optimal collusive equilibrium is of type 1 (type 2) if and only if:
x∗ > (≤)k. (5)
4Proof. (⇐) For all ¯ x<x ∗ the deﬁnition of x∗ implies D(2¯ x)¯ x<D (2x∗)x∗ =
D(2xc)xc.T h e np i c k¯ x = k,t oo b t a i nπkk < πll.
(⇒) We have X ≡ xf + x−f.A s D(X)xf is strictly concave, D(2k)k<
D(2xc)xc implies either k>x c, which is ruled out by assumption, or (exclusively
so) k<x ∗.
This result completes the analysis in BLM by identifying an easy to use
criterion that determines the type of collusion. The intuition is very clear. If
the capacity constraint is very severe (x∗ >k )i nt h a tﬁrms’ instantaneous joint
proﬁt is less than in the unconstrained Cournot case, it pays to invest more
in a collusion equilibrium. Otherwise ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to stop investing
in order to earn superior proﬁts at each point in time forever. Remark that
k = dxce−1N(xc), by assumption, so that the condition k<x ∗ is equivalent to
comparing the integer component of xc, minus 1 only if xc is natural, with x∗.
BLM focus on type 1 equilibria, but type 2 equilibria are also noteworthy
from an industrial organization perspective. When x∗ ≤ k and (4) hold, the
dynamic collusion equilibrium in investment choices mimics a static collusive
outcome in quantities, despite instantaneous Cournot competition. The greater
the pre-installed capacity k relative to Cournot output, the greater the likelihood
of inﬁnite delay.
4E x a m p l e s
We now study the applicability of Propositions 2 and 3 to diﬀerent demand
functions. To begin with, consider the common linear speciﬁcation.
Example 1 Suppose that P(X)=a − bX,w i t ha,b > 0.
Firm f’s proﬁtf u n c t i o ni sπf(xf,x −f)=( a − b(xf + x−f))xf.F o rt y p e1
collusion to occur, we know from Proposition 3 that x∗ >kis necessary. In
this linear setup, it is easy to check that this condition is incompatible with
the model’s main assumptions, namely that the game is near its end, that is
xc − 1 ≤ k, and that capacity units are lumpy, so that k ≥ 1.
Claim 4 In the case of linear demand, collusive equilibria are always of type 2.
Proof. By Proposition 3, type 1 collusion arises if x∗ >k .W i t hP(X)=a−bX,
we have xc = 1
3
a
b and it is direct to compute x∗ = 1
6
a
b. By assumption, the lumpy
pre-installed capacity must satisfy k ≥ 1, and the near end condition imposes
xc−1 ≤ k. This latter condition implies that 1
3
a
b ≤ k+1≤ 2,s o1
6
a
b ≤ 1, hence
x∗ ≤ k.
It follows that the linear speciﬁcation is limited as an illustration of BLM’s
full analysis of tacitly collusive investment decisions. However, by considering
5a broader class of demand functions, we can illustrate all the possible cases of
Propositions 2 and 3.





C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r ek =1 , l =2 ,a si nB L M . 3 Here the speciﬁcc h o i c e
of a implies that xc =2 , and allows us to focus on the role of the curvature
parameter δ. By means of Propositions 2 and 3 above, we can completely
characterize in terms of the parameters β and δ the collusive equilibria for this
family of demand functions. To begin with, by Proposition 3:
Claim 5 The collusive equilibrium, if it exists, is of type 1 (type 2) if and only
if δ > (≤)1.




The critical output x∗ that solves π(x∗,x ∗)=π(xc,x c) satisﬁes (a−2δbx∗δ)x∗ =




b for a,w eg e tx∗ as the lower root of:







where fδ(z) is concave in z over R+ and has xc =2as its upper root. If
fδ(1) < 0,t h e nx∗ >kand collusion is of type 1 (conversely, if fδ(1) ≥ 0,








where fδ(1) is a concave function of δ over R+.T h et w or o o t sa r eδ =0(which
is non admissible) and δ =1 .F o rδ > 1 (≤ 1), fδ(1) < 0 (≥ 0) and collusion is
type 1 (type 2).
It is interesting to remark that the linear demand form of Example 1 exactly
constitutes a limiting case of type 2 collusion with the speciﬁcation that δ =1
in Example 2. Here the type 1 collusion that BLM focus on may occur only if
demand satisﬁes their assumption of strict concavity, that is δ > 1.
The two conditions of Proposition 2 are checked by directly calculating the
proﬁts π11, π12, π21,a n dπ22. As a result, we are able to numerically partition
the parameter space in (β,δ) (the magnitude of b has no impact on the relative
proﬁts at diﬀerent investment levels). The results are plotted in Figure 1 for
the values β ∈ (1,3] and δ ∈ (1/2,3/2] where all four possible scenarios (type
1/type 2 collusion, existence/nonexistence) arise.
3Note that, although this demand does not satisfy the strict concavity assumption made

















Figure 1: In Example 2, there is type 1 collusion in region I (points on the
frontier δ =1 , that correspond to the linear case, are excluded). There is type
2 collusion in region II.
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Appendix
Before proving Proposition 2, we establish the following lemma:4








xf,a n dl e te x =a r gm a x x≤l π(x,k).
Then, πlk + πkl = π(e x,k)+π (k,e x) ≡ Π(e x + k),w h e r eΠ(X) denotes in-
dustry proﬁt. Let Xm denote the monopoly quantity. First, suppose that
e x + k<X m.B e c a u s e π
¡
xf,x −f¢
is strictly submodular (we have D0 < 0),
πll + πkk = π (xc,x c)+π(k,k) < π(xc,k)+π(k,xc)=Π(xc + k), and since
xc + k ≤ e x + k and industry proﬁti si n c r e a s i n gt ot h el e f to fXm,w eh a v e
πll + πkk < Π(xc + k) ≤ Π(e x + k). Otherwise, suppose that e x + k ≥ Xm.L e t
x∗(k) = argmaxx∈R+ π(x,k),w h e r ex∗(k) is the unconstrained best-response





¯ ¯ ¯ < 1 it must be that x∗(k)+k<2xc.S i n c ee x ≤ x∗(k) we
have e x+k<2xc.A se x+k ≥ Xm, industry revenue is decreasing to the right of
e x+k,s oΠ(e x + k) ≥ Π(2xc). Finally, Π(2xc)=2 π (xc,x c) > π(xc,x c)+π (k,k)
when πll > πkk. Therefore Π(e x + k) > π(xc,x c)+π (k,k)=πll + πkk.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
(1) By Proposition 1, and (2), a collusive equilibrium exists if and only if S∗ −
L(y,y∗
kl) ≥ 0, ∀y ≤ y∗
kl,w h e r eS∗ − L(y,y∗
kl) is written as:
πkk − πlk
r − α






























πll−πklI.T h ef u n c t i o nS∗ −L(y,y∗
kl) is
convex in y, strictly positive and decreasing at 0 (BLM). It is non-negative on
the interval [0,y∗
kl] if and only if either (i) it has a non-positive derivative and
a non-negative value at y∗
kl, or (ii) its minimum value over R+ is non-negative.
4The same reasoning also holds for the potentially convex demand in Example 2.
8We know from BLM that the latter condition holds if and only if (3) holds. We
show that the former condition cannot hold. To see that, compute the derivative
of S∗ − L(y,y∗





































which is non-positive if:
(πll − πkk)
β ≤ (πll − πkl)
β−1 [βπll − πkk − (β − 1)πlk].






















which is non-negative if:
(πll − πkl)
β−1 [πll − βπkk +( β − 1)πkl] ≤ (πll − πkk)
β .
Therefore, for a non-positive derivative and a non-negative value at y∗
kl,t h e
following two conditions must hold jointly:
(
(πll − πkk)
β ≤ (πll − πkl)
β−1 [βπll − πkk − (β − 1)πlk]
(πll − πkl)
β−1 [πll − βπkk +( β − 1)πkl] ≤ (πll − πkk)
β .
However, this implies that:
πlk + πkl ≤ πll + πkk,
violating Lemma 1. Hence S∗−L(y,y∗
kl) cannot have both a non-positive deriv-
ative and a non-negative value at y∗
kl. Consequently, it is non-negative on the
interval [0,y∗
kl] if and only (3) holds.
( 2 )I nt h i sc a s e ,S∗ − L(y,y∗


















πll−πklI,a n dt h ed e r i v a t i v eo f S∗ − L(y,y∗









¶β−1 πlk − πll
r − α
.
9As above, S∗ − L(y,y∗
kl) is a convex function of y that is strictly positive and
strictly decreasing at the origin. Let us ﬁrst study the behavior of S∗−L(y,y∗
kl)
at y∗
kl. The derivative at y∗
kl has the sign of:
(β − 1)πlk + πkk − πll > 0,
meaning that the minimum of S∗ − L(y,y∗
kl) always lies in [0,y∗
kl).N o t ei n c i -
dentally that S∗−L(y,y∗
kl) is always positive at y∗
kl. A tacit collusion equilibrium
therefore exists if and only if the value of S∗−L(y,y∗
kl) at this minimum in non-




















































β (πlk − πll)(πll − πkl)
β−1 ≥ (πlk − πkk)
β .
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